Fault tolerant control aims at removing or at least reducing the negative effects of disturbances in an automation system, in order to maintain the best performance as far as possible. Such a task is performed in three steps: the fault detection, the fault identification, and the consequent process recovery. Let us consider a hybrid model in which a continuous, time invariant, linear system is excited by a quantised disturbance signal: a decoding approach can be undertaken to perform detection and identification. For this purpose, in this article we propose a low-complexity, recursive decoding algorithm, which has been developed using techniques from information and coding theory and here adapted to the control framework. Our aim is to analyse and test the decoding approach to control in the case of binary quantisation, in a flight control scenario. We report both theoretical and simulations' results and derive optimal design criteria.
Introduction
Fault tolerant control (FTC; Blanke, Kinnaert, Lunze, Staroswiecki, and Schro¨der 2006; Isermann 2006; Ducard 2009) aims to cancel or contain the consequences of faults in an automation system. Such an operation is fundamental in modern technological processes, which are required to assure robust performance, stability and safety even in the case of partial malfunctions or degradations. Often, robustness is achieved by redundancy, say by the introduction of many control components like sensors; nevertheless, this sophistication naturally increases the probability of breakdown and then continues to motivate the research on reliable control systems.
The problem of upholding the functionality of an apparatus affected by a disturbance is ubiquitous in the industrial and transport fields. In particular, FTC systems are widely applied in those contexts where human health and environment are concerned, for example, in the design of mechanical and chemical plants; nuclear power reactors; medical systems; aircrafts, helicopters and spacecrafts; automotive engines, railway and marine vehicles. Another application is in the communication networks (e.g. wireless sensor networks), where the aim of FTC is to avoid unexpected interruptions of data flow in the case of troubled connectivity or impaired nodes. In general, a satisfying FTC design prevents total failures and stops, with the ultimate objective of reducing health, environmental and economic damages.
The literature about FTC is definitely widespread and contributions arise from diverse applied mathematical domains. Several survey works report the main theoretical concepts and provide classifications of the outstanding FTC approaches, with detailed references; for example, we refer the reader to the recent review by Zhang and Jiang (2008) , which supplies a comprehensive bibliography, and to Willsky (1976) , Stengel (1991) , Patton (1997) and Jiang (2005) .
As far as the applications are concerned, flight control has been motivating FTC research since 1970s, given the evident danger that aircraft faults may cause to human safety. A significant number of papers have been produced on the argument, pertaining to the many different aspects that characterise a safe flight dynamics. For a general overview, see Steinberg (2005) , Eterno, Weiss, Looze, and Willsky (1985) and the up-to-date book by Ducard (2009) in which Chapter II provides the list of the most common flight control systems, with the relative references.
In this work, we consider a linear model with a multiplicative disturbance factor, which is common in flight control (Ye and Yang 2006) ; in particular, we adopt the system presented by Ackermann (1984 Ackermann ( , 1985 and also studied by Yee, Wang, and Jiang (2002) and Fagnani, Maksimov, and Pandolfi (2004) as an application test.
Even if FTC systems can be designed in many different ways according to the specific aim they are conceived for, in general they all have to perform the following main tasks:
(1) the fault detection: the controller makes a binary decision on the presence of a malfunction; (2) the fault identification: the controller determines or estimates the size of the disturbance; when necessary, identification is preceded by the fault isolation, that is, the location of the impaired component; (3) an active compensation to the fault, i.e. the reconfiguration of the system inputs and/or parameters in order to maintain, as much as possible, the integrity of the process.
Fault detection and identification (FDI) can be undertaken in diverse ways. In the cited works, in particular Ducard (2009) a comprehensive discussion about the most popular FDI schemes is presented: among them, we recall the unknown input observers (UIO; Viswanadham and Srichander 1987; Patton 1997) and residual generation; the Kalman filtering; the statistical methods and the more recent techniques based on neural networks (Napolitano et al. 1995) .
In this article, we present a novel approach to FDI. Our setting is a continuous, time invariant, linear system in which a quantised disturbance input is introduced. Such a hybrid model, that combines discrete and continuous dynamics, is motivated by the upcoming digitalisation of modern devices: a quantised disturbance may represent the switches of actuators and sensors or a malfunction in a digital component; moreover, it may describe the behaviour of any mechanical device that is known to occupy only certain positions and also it may be the approximation of a continuous disturbance.
Results about FTC for hybrid systems are not very common; in part, they can be retrieved in the extensive discussion about the detection of abrupt changes in dynamical systems, whose leading work is by Basseville and Nikiforov (1993) (while some further contributions are given by Lai and Shan 1999 and Nikiforov 2000) . The problem of estimating brusque alterations is always actual (see, e.g. Venkatasubramanian, Leung, and Moorman 2007; Sumbul, Santos, and Pauly 2009) , which respectively concern medical imaging and ground-penetrating radar issues) and in general is approached by classical estimation techniques, such as Kalman filtering.
Recently, input quantisation in linear systems has been studied with the aim of reducing the effects of a coarse quantisation (Elia and Mitter 2001; Park, Choi, and Yun 2008) . In this work, instead, our purpose is to detect faults using the information that the disturbance input is quantised, assuming the quantisation to be sufficiently accurate.
In order to detect and evaluate a quantised input disturbance, we propose an information theoretic approach: given the discrete nature of the disturbance, we suggest to perform FDI using a decoding procedure derived from digital transmissions and Coding Theory (see the book by Richardson and Urbanke (2008) for a general introduction on the argument). The algorithm we will introduce has already been tested in deconvolution issues by Fagnani and Fosson (2009) ; the problem we address here still is a deconvolution problem, as the model is a linear system, but in addition a feedback is introduced to minimise the consequence of faults and a compensation input is supplied in real time (which naturally does not occur in classical deconvolution issues).
The structure of this article is the follows: in Section 2, we describe the problem; in Section 3, we introduce the decoding algorithm we intend to use for the fault detection; in Section 4, we provide a theoretical analysis aimed at deriving optimal design criteria (Section 5). The analysis includes considerations about the sensitivity of system to the false alarm ( false positive) and to miss detection ( false negative), promptness of detection and reconfiguration. In Section 6 we show a few significant simulations about a specific numerical example, arisen from flight control literature; finally, in Sections 7 and 8 we propose some considerations about possible quantisation errors and a few concluding observations.
Notation
In this article, we will use the following notation:
. given a subset A of a set , 1 1 A : ! f0, 1g will denote the indicator function, defined by 1 1 A ðxÞ ¼ 1 if x belongs to A and 1 1 A ðxÞ ¼ 0 otherwise;
x e Às ds for any x 2 R; . random variables will be indicated by capital letters; . given any variable x,x will denote its estimation.
Problem statement
Let us consider processes that can be modelled by the following linear, finite-dimensional system:
where x(t) 2 R n , y(t) 2 R m , f(t) and z(t) are scalar functions and A, B and C are constant matrices with consistent dimensions. f(t) is a known input signal, while z(t) is a disturbance term. Typically, z(t) 2 (0, 1]; if z(t) ¼ 1, the system operates in its nominal (i.e. fault-free) regime and is totally driven by f(t): this is the condition that one aims at reproducing when z(t) 2 (0, 1), that is, when some fault affects the dynamics. For this purpose, a control input u(t) 2 R is introduced, which adjusts the dynamics as follows:
Notice that, in principle, it is sufficient to fix uðtÞ ¼ f ðtÞð 1 zðtÞ À 1Þ to maintain the error-free behaviour, say Bz(t)( f(t) þ u(t)) ¼ Bf(t); nevertheless, in the real applications, this is often impossible for the reasons we now explain. Generally, the disturbance z(t) is not known and the the controller can access it only through the observation of the output y(t); thus, z(t) must be determined by deconvolution, namely by inverting the solution of the system (2):
Deconvolution is known to be an ill-posed and illconditioned problem: the uniqueness of the solution is not guaranteed and small errors in the data (which are unavoidable due to measurement uncertainties) may cause large errors in the solution. The reconstruction of z(t) by inversion may thus produce defective outcomes, which recommends an estimation approach to the problem.
In this work, we also assume that the controller can access y(t) only at each time instants. More precisely, Assumption 2.1: The available data are the samples
( for simplicity, let K ¼ T ) where the n k 's represent the measurement inaccuracies and are realisations of independent, zero-mean, Gaussian random variables.
Moreover,
Assumption 2.2: The disturbance function z(t) is quantised over two levels and can assume the values 0 ¼ 1 and 1 2 (0, 1). The time switches between 0 and 1 are not governed by any known probabilistic law.
The last statement underlines that no prior stochastic information is available on the behaviour of z(t), which is a difference with respect to Fagnani and Fosson (2009) . 0 and 1 may, respectively, represent the fault-free and the faulty conditions. This binary situation occurs in many technological applications: some examples are the abrupt blocking of a process, the disconnection of an actuator and more in general the behaviour of all kinds of devices that may switch on or off. In the following, we will refer to the jumps from 0 and 1 and vice versa as switch points.
Under Assumption 2.2, fault detection and fault identification coincide: the decision on the fault presence automatically determines also its size. We have to remark that this is not the most common FTC scenario: in most applications, in fact, the faulty value 1 is not known and is continuous (e.g. it belongs to an interval of real numbers). In these cases, the unknown value must be identified and quantisation can be adopted only if it is sufficiently fine to ensure a reliable identification. In this work, we however consider a binary, perfect quantisation for the following reasons. First, the use of digital devices, which work within finite sets of values, is nowadays widespread and increasing also in control systems. The state of a digital device can assume a finite number of possible levels and a fault may be represented by an undesired switch among levels. In this context, the signals are not continuous and quantisation is naturally implied by the problem itself. On the other hand, the choice of a binary quantisation, which in many cases is too restrictive, has mainly an introductory purpose: given the novelty of our approach to FTC, it is preferable to analyse it in the simplest scenario. More complicated (and more realistic) cases will be addressed in future work.
Coming back to our model (2) under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, our aim is to estimate z(t) in order to provide a suitable feedback compensation to the system. Clearly, the estimation has to be performed on-line: each time a sample is acquired, the controller tries to detect possible faults and thereby updates the system design. For mathematical simplicity, the switch points of z(t) are supposed to occur at the time instants k, in order to have synchronisation with the output sampling. Thus, we can write:
Notice that forcing synchronisation does not affect the performance of our algorithm, but just causes some negligible variation in its delay (see Sections 3 and 4). At this point, z(t) is equivalent to the binary sequence (z 0 , . . . , z KÀ1 ) 2 { 0 , 1 } K , and the estimation problem can be recasted in a discrete framework. Letẑ k be an estimate of z k : since the operation must be performed on-line, we expect z kÀ1 ¼ Dð y 1 , . . . , y k Þ, where D indicates a detection/ estimation function. The natural definition of the control input is:
As the first measurement is performed at time , the initial valueẑ À1 is arbitrarily fixed; a sensible choice iŝ z À1 ¼ 1, namely no compensation is introduced into the system in [0, ). Introducing (5) and (6) into (3), for any t 2 [k, (k þ 1)), k 2 {0, . . . , K À 1}, by an easy computation we obtain
where x k ¼ x(k). Then, the evolution of system (2) with (5) and (6) can be written recursively as
In (8), we have not specified yet how we intend to computeẑ k : our detection algorithm will be introduced in Section 3.
Illustrative example: a flight control problem
Before introducing our FDI algorithm, let us notice that systems of kind (1) (1) represents the longitudinal short-period mode of an F4-E jet with additional horizontal canards, in supersonic conditions. The vector x(t) determines the longitudinal trajectory: its three entries, respectively, represent the normal acceleration, the pitch rate and the deviation of elevator deflection from the trim position. The output y(t) is the C* response, a parameter that synthesises the aircraft response to the pilot inputs; typically, the C* response must lie in a given admissible flight envelope. This application example is illustrated in the Appendix D.1 of the book by Ackermann (1985) and studied also in Ackermann (1984) , Yee et al. (2002) and Fagnani et al. (2004) .
Referring to this example, f(t) can be interpreted as the elevator deflection command and z(t) as the indicator of the status of the elevators: z ¼ 0 may attest a good status, while the switch to z ¼ 1 may denote an abrupt loss of effectiveness. In such a case, the controller is required to detect the accident and introduce a suitable control input u(t) in order to recover the optimal trajectory, say the one imposed by the flight plan. In terms of the output y(t), one aims at maintaining or at bringing it back within the prescribed envelope.
In this context, it makes sense to suppose that the elevator cannot recover its efficiency during the flight: this is a case of failure, which will be our case study in the next. This Flight Control Problem will be retrieved later and used as test application for the implementation of our detection algorithm, which is introduced in the next section.
estimator that exploits the prior information about the input source.
The detection method that we introduce in this section is derived from an optimal decoding algorithm named BCJR after its authors (Bahl, Cocke, Jelinek, and Raviv 1974) . Given the noisy output of a digital transmission, the BCJR computes the probabilities of all the possible codewords, implementing a maximum a posteriori (MAP; Richardson and Urbanke 2008) estimation through a recursive procedure. In particular, given codes defined on trellises, it evaluates the a posteriori probabilities of each state.
The classical version of the algorithm is constituted by two recursions (one forward, one backward) and requires the transmission of the whole message before decoding and that the system has a finite number of states. It is however possible to modify its procedure to relax these constraints: for example, one can make it causal (hence to work on line) by removing the backward recursion and consider a fixed number of states even when the system potentially has infinite states. In Fagnani and Fosson (2009) , these variations (which inevitably cause some loss of performance) are widely discussed. The algorithm we introduce here is a causal BCJR that envisages just one-state at each step (for this reason we refer to it as the One-State Algorithm). Its complexity is definitely low, which encourages its implementation. The performance actually depends on the specific application case and will be analysed in the following sections.
Let us describe the operative structure of the One-State Algorithm in detail.
One-State Algorithm's pattern
By (7), we have
The key idea of the One-State procedure is to recursively provide estimatesx k andẑ kÀ1 of x k and z kÀ1 given the current lecture y k and the estimatex kÀ1 of the previous state x kÀ1 . Given (8) and kÁk m being the Euclidean norm in R m , the One-State Algorithm's pattern as follows:
One-State Algorithm:
(1) For k ¼ 0:
Initialisation:
System evolution:
For the binary nature of each z k , the process of estimation/detection of the One-State Algorithm reduces to the comparison between two distances. Finally, just two storage locations (a float for the current state and a boolean for the current disturbance) are required: the complexity is very low.
Remark 1: The One-State Algorithm can easily extend the case of quantisation with q 4 2 levels, by comparing the distances between the received symbol and the q possible signals; nevertheless, the theoretical analysis of the performance, as we propose it in the following section, would be definitely more complicated.
Theoretical analysis of the One-State Algorithm
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis of the performance of the One-State Algorithm with the final aim to determine optimal design criteria for our FTC system. We will focus on the system (8) with a failure, that is, in the presence of just one switch point
or equivalently, z k ¼ 0 for k ¼ 0, 1, . . . , k F À 1 and
Switch points are critical since they always cause deviations from the desired trajectory due to the detection delay. In fact, u(t) is deceptive in [k, (k þ 1)) when a switch occurs at k, as it is function ofẑ kÀ1 , which in turn depends on the evolution of the system in [0, k).
Considering the case of one-switch point is then oriented to isolate and understand this phenomenon, as well as motivated by the ubiquity of failure occurrences in the applications.
Probabilistic setting
Assuming the measurement noises n k 's to be realisations of independent, zero-mean, Gaussian random variables, a certain amount of uncertainty affects all the system (8); in particularẑ kÀ1 , x(t) and y(t) are also random variables as they are directly or indirectly functions of the noise. The evolution of our FTC procedure in probabilistic terms is as follows (capital letters indicate random variables):
where D 1 indicates the One-State decoding/detection function. We recall that z(t) is not supposed to be driven by any known stochastic rule.
Aim of the analysis
The performance of the One-State Algorithm must be determined in terms of a suitable distance between the desired and the real output. Let us consider the Flight Control Problem (Section 2.1) as reference: the output y(t), which summarises the features of the aircraft's trajectory, must be maintained in a prescribed flight envelope. This can be interpreted in two ways: the distance between desired and real output must be (a) bounded in a certain range (b) minimised as much as possible, tolerating infrequent and temporary excursions outside the flight envelope. For our model, these conditions can be effectively formulated as follows:
(1) choose so that the maximal amplitude M of the deviations is minimised; (2) choose so that the probability P that the distance between desired and real output is null is maximised.
Since in a flight context both conditions may be important, we propose to merge the two criteria in this way: for a small fixed tolerance ", we define the optimal as opt ¼ argmin
In other terms, we first individuate a possible set S " so that P is above a safety threshold 1 À " and then we choose 2 S " that minimises the maximal amplitude. This trade-off strategy has been derived observing that, for our model, a larger corresponds to a larger P, but also to larger deviations at switch points (even in the case of correct detection), i.e. to a larger M. In the following sections, we will specialise the criterion (12) to our setting, in terms of an error function (Sections 4.3 and 4.4); afterwards, we will discuss how to compute opt in some specific cases (Section 5) and test it in the Flight Control Problem.
4.3
Error function and probability of n-step error decay The error function we adopt to represent the distance between the desired and the real output is given by the discrete stochastic process (E k ) k¼0, 1, . . . , that describes the difference between the state X k and the nominal (i.e. fault-free) state x N ðtÞ :
Let us note that Lemma 4.1: For any k 0 , n 2 N, the events
Proof: It immediately follows from the definition of E k : for any n 2 N, the event {E kþ1 ¼ e A E k } coincides to fẐ kÀ1 ¼ z k g and then fE k 0 þn ¼ e nA E k 0 g coincides to
Note that under the hypothesis of the proposition and if A is asymptotically stable, E k exponentially decays to zero, regardless of the initial value E k 0 . Moreover, observe that fẐ kÀ1 ¼ z k g is not the event of correct detection fẐ k ¼ z k g, since the feedback in the system implies a delay ; however, if z k is constant over the considered interval, the two events coincide.
Afterwards, let
where theX k 's are the states estimated by the One-State Algorithm. Given k 0 , n 2 N, k 0 ! 1, we define the probability of n-step error decay (EDP n for short) as
where d 2 R n , , 2 { 0 , 1 }. Let us now reformulate the optimisation problem (12) in a more precise way.
For simplicity, from now onwards we will assume y(t) 2 R, as in the Flight Control Problem. Before the failure, P corresponds to EDP T F =À1 ð1, 0, 0 , 0 Þ, while after the failure it corresponds to EDP ðTÀT F Þ=À1 ðk F þ 1, D k F , 0 , 1 Þ. Furthermore, the maximal deviation M can be approximated by k(CE 0 , . . . , CE K )k 1 (this is an approximation since the peak may be placed at any time instant in (0, K], not only at instants k). In conclusion, for a small fixed tolerance " 4 0,
Notice that if 2 S " , with probability 1 À " there are no detection errors and kðCE 0 , . . . , CE K Þk 1 ¼ CE k F þ1 . We will retrieve this issue in Section 5.
Evaluation of the probability of n-step error decay
The evaluation of EDP n for the One-State Algorithm, which is necessary to assess the formula (14), is the central result of our theoretical analysis and will be used in the following section to compute opt in some significant instances.
Proposition 4.2: Let y(t) 2 R and 2 be the variance of N k ; let us call
the two possible received signals estimated by the One-State Algorithm at time step k. Then,
In order to prove this proposition, we need a few technical lemmas. Let us define the following detection error probability P det : given k 2 N, d 2 R n and 2 { 0 , 1 },
EDP is connected to P det by the following law:
Lemma 4.3:
that is, the error decays when the detection is correct.
Notice that this relation between EDP and P det subsists in virtue of the condition z k 0 À1 ¼ z k 0 : if k 0 were a switch point, the feedback delay would produce a deviation in the error function in the case of correct detection. Generalising to n steps, 
Proof: Under the hypothesis that z kÀ1 ¼ 1 , P det is given by
The last step depends on the Gaussian distribution of N k ; notice also that 1 À 0 CM k ¼ S 1 k À S 0 k 4 0. It follows also that for S 1 k S 0 k :
This actually corresponds to the false negative probability. The false positive probability P det ðk À 1, d, Þj ðz kÀ1 ¼ 0 Þ can be computed in the same way and the result is:
The thesis is then proved. oe
Remark 2: By the definition of D k , we have
where z c k indicates the complementary of z k in { 0 , 1 }. This probability may be interpreted as the transition probability of the Markov process ðD k ,Ẑ kÀ1 Þ k¼0,1,... in the state space D Â { 0 , 1 }, D & R n , with starting state ðD 0 ,Ẑ À1 Þ ¼ ð0, 0 Þ. A thorough analysis of this process using Markov theory should provide more general results than ours, but this approach is too complex when the problem is multidimensional.
This expression suggests an information theoretic interpretation of our problem. In fact, the presence of the Gaussian noise in the data lecture can be thought as if signal C x k were transmitted on an AWGN channel. If D kÀ1 ¼ 0, Cx k can be S 0 k or S 1 k . Moreover, if we shift the signals by their average, so that they become antipodal AE 
Given that the spectral density of the Gaussian noise is N 0 ¼ 2 2 , the argument of the erfc function in (18) turns out to be the square root of the so-called signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), defined as SNR k, ¼ E k /N 0 , of our ideal channel. The subscripts emphasise the dependence of the SNR on time and on parameter .
Generally, the SNR compares the magnitudes of the transmitted signal and of the channel noise and it is widely used in information theory to describe channel performance. In our framework, the SNR determines the reliability of the detection, say the reliability of the channel where Cx k is ideally transmitted. This remark emphasises that our problem is analogous to a common digital-transmission paradigm and bears out the idea of using decoding techniques to the detection task.
In the next section, we will use the common dB notation for the SNR, that is, we express it as 10log 10 of its value.
Remark 4: Since typically 1 5 0 , by expression (18) we have P det ðk À 1, 0, 1 Þ 5 P det ðk À 1, 0, 0 Þ:
Given thatẐ kÀ2 ¼ 1 is generally more likely when z kÀ2 ¼ 1 (otherwise our detection method would be improper), we can conclude that our detection algorithm is more reliable after the failure, or, in other terms, it is more sensitive to false positives.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Note that z k is assumed to be constant in [k 0 À1, k 0 þ n À 1], that is, we consider the system before or after a failure event. By Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4, we have EDP n ðk 0 , d, , Þ
Let us now briefly distinguish the behaviour of EDP n before and after the failure.
False positive evaluation
Let us suppose the system to be affected by a failure according to the model (10) with k F ! 1, that is, the system is not faulty from the beginning. In particular, since there is no compensation at the first time step (or equivalentlyẐ À1 ¼ 0 ), no false positive is produced at k ¼ 0. Then, studying EDP in [1, k F ) actually corresponds to evaluate the probability that no false positives occur during the whole pre-failure transient regime. Given that D 0 ¼ 0, we have
Since
Switch point
Suppose that D k F ¼ 0, then in particular,Ẑ k F À1 ¼ z k F À1 andẐ k F À1 6 ¼ z k F . In other terms, the detection is correct, but the compensation, based on the detection at the previous step, is not efficient with regard to a switch point. Our detection method cannot control what happens at step k F , that is, in the time interval [T F , T F þ ).
False negative evaluation
Given that we cannot control the system immediately after the switch point, it is likely that E k F þ1 6 ¼ 0. We now want to study the probability of decay of the error function towards zero, which actually corresponds to the evaluation of the false negatives. In fact, under the hypothesis D k F ¼ 0 (i.e. no false positives and in particularẐ k F À1 ¼ 0 ),
The considerations about EDP made in the previous sections are now specialised to the case of constant input f(t).
Constant input f(t)
If the input f(t) is constant the last expression can be simplified and analytically evaluated, as the system evolution does not depend on time step k. Let us fix f 1: we have
for any n 2 N such that n þ 1 k F and
In terms of SNR ratio, we can write ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi SNR ðÞ p ¼
Under the hypothesis 0 5 1 5 0 ¼ 1, SNR ( 0 ) 5 SNR ( 1 ), that is EDP m (k 0 , 0, 0 , 0 ) 5 EDP m (k 1 , 0, 1 , 1 ); in other terms, our detection algorithm is more sensitive to false positives, then our FTC method is more efficient after the failure. Thus, the suitable design criteria for the pre-failure state will be automatically appropriate also for the post-failure state, recalling that in general we ask EDP to be larger than a given threshold (see (24)).
For this motivation, in the following section we will focus on the pre-failure framework and, for brevity, we will adopt this notation:
The following section is devoted to assess the optimal design criteria for our FTC system, in a few instances, on the basis of the theoretical analysis developed in this section.
Design criteria
On the basis of the previous analysis, let us assess the optimal design criteria for our FTC system in two different input instances: f(t) constant and f(t) sinusoidal. As far as the first case in concerned, we will show that the theoretic analysis of Section 4 provides the instruments to determine the optimal sampling step in an analytic way. On the other hand, when the input is not constant some difficulties arise in the analytical computation.
Design criteria in the case of constant input f(t)
Let us evaluate opt when f(t) 1. If there are no detection errors, the maximal deviation in the output is in the interval (k F , (k F þ 1)] and is equal to max t 2 ð0, j 1 À 0 0 CM t j where M t ¼ (e tA À I)A À1 B. Let us approximate it by CE k F þ1 ¼ j 1 À 0 0 CM j. Given the definition of opt in (14), our aim is then to provide opt ¼ argmin
where
Application to the Flight Control Problem
Let us now compute opt for the Flight Control Problem introduced in Section 2.1, in the case of constant input f(t). In Figure 1 , the graph of CM in function of is shown. In particular, we notice that CM is negative for any 4 0, achieves a global minimum at 0 ¼ 0.55 and converges to a constant value for a sufficiently large . Then, if 4 0 , max t 2 ð0, jCM t j ¼ jCM 0 j, that is, the peak is fixed and we cannot control it. This undesired occurrence can be prevented by imposing 2 ð0, 0 :
In this interval, CM is monotone decreasing and we exactly have max t2(0,] jCM t j ¼ jCM j. Then, for the fixed tolerance ", our aim (see (14)) is the computation of opt ¼ argmin
where W ¼ n indicates the length of the window we are considering. Note that
# W= is monotone increasing as a function of . Then, let m ¼ m (") be the minimum in (0, 0 ] such that EDP W/ 4 1 À " (if it exists). Then
Now, let us assign numerical values to the parameters and solve the corresponding instance: if
then opt ¼ 0.12 as shown in Figure 2 . The value of opt clearly depends on the noise and in particular, noise values for which there is no making EDP W/ 4 1 À " can exist: for instance, this occurs if we consider 2 4 34.72 in the example (27) (the range of admissible 2 's with the corresponding opt 's is shown in Figure 3 ). In such occurrences, one should allow a lower threshold 1 À ".
Design criteria in the case of input f(t)^sin t
When f(t) is not constant, it is more difficult to study analytical design criteria as the quality of the detection depends on time. In particular, at each time step k the detection is affected by the values of f(t), t 2 ((k À 1), k), then any detection step is different from the others and an analogous of (24) cannot be provided: roughly speaking, the optimum would be to change according to the shape of f(t) in each considered interval.
When f(t) is periodic, we can suggest some numerical computation in order to fix a suitable . In fact, if we compute EDP W/ (1, 0, 0 , 0 ) for a sufficiently large W, we get an idea about the sampling times that are more suitable. On the other hand, there is no way to control the amplitude of the deviation in case of failure, given its dependence on time. The idea is then to choose as sampling time that maximises EDP W/ (1, 0, 0 , 0 ) or that makes it larger than a given threshold, understanding that this does not arrange the issue of the unavoidable deviation.
Let us illustrate these observations in the Flight Control Problem with f(t) ¼ sin t and parameters given by (27) . First, let us numerically compute EDP W/ (1, 0, 0 , 0 ) in function of , the result is presented in Figure 4 : the graph shows a clear unsettled behaviour which cannot be described analytically. However, it also suggests the values of that give an high EDP W/ (1, 0, 0 , 0 ) and which can then be considered suitable.
More details about this instance can be retrieved in the simulations presented in the following section.
Flight Control Problem: a few simulations
In this section, we show some simulations concerning the application of the One-State Algorithm to the Flight Control Problem presented in Section 2.1 and studied in the previous paragraphs.
In a time interval [0, T ] ¼ [0, 40], we suppose that a failure occurs at T F ¼ 20 and causes the switch of the disturbance function z(t) from 0 ¼ 1 to 1 ¼ 1/2 ( 1 ¼ 1/2 might represent a loss of effectiveness of 50% of the elevator of the aircraft). The measurement noise is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance 2 ¼ 2. We consider both the cases of input f 1 and f(t) ¼ sin t and we show the behaviour of the One-State procedure for different values of . The graphs in Figure 5 represent the output y(t) of the system. Figure 5 reproduces the case f 1. The first graph compares the nominal system, that is, the desirable trajectory, to the faulty system with no compensation: after the failure, the trajectory of the latter is appreciably incorrect. In the other graphs, we introduce the compensation using the One-State Algorithm: as proved in Section 5.1.1, opt ¼ 0.12. In the second graph, we fix ¼ 0.4, which is larger than opt : we obtain a correct detection at each step, but the unavoidable deviation is not optimised: in fact, considering opt (third graph), we have a smaller peak after the failure. Furthermore, we see that also ¼ 0.09 is suitable, even if, the corresponding EDP W/ is smaller than 1 À ". On the other hand, ¼ 0.06 assures a good detection only after the failure (this is consistent with our observation about the different sensitivity of false positives and false negatives), while a too small sampling time ( ¼ 0.001) causes instability: the detection is not reliable and the error is always non-null. Figure 6 concerns the case f(t) ¼ sin t. The output of the system with no compensation in the first graph undergoes an evident change after the failure at T F ¼ 20. Instead, applying the One-State Algorithm with time step ¼ 0.525 (this value being suggested by the numerical computation of the EDP) allows to recover the nominal condition. The same occurs with ¼ 0.35, which is preferable for the smaller amplitude of the unavoidable deviation with regard to the switch point. Figure 3 . The optimal 's as the noise variance 2 changes 
When ¼ 0.3, some detections fail (the error percentage is about 4%), but the output y(t) is not dramatically affected by them. Furthermore, when ¼ 0.01 the error percentage is about 9%: many deviations occur, but they are not very large. In particular, they are quite null when the slope of y(t) is steeper. With regard to the switch point a plain oscillation is present, but it is less remarkable than in the cases of larger .
Decreasing again, the percentage of wrong detections does not overpass 10%, but for very small values of , the system is unstable (see, e.g. the last graph corresponding to ¼ 0.001) and many oscillations occur.
Inaccurate quantisation
The disturbance function considered in this work assumes only two known values. This is a simplified Figure 5 . Fault-free system vs. system with a failure at T F ¼ 20, with measurement noise of variance 2 ¼ 2 and f 1. The x-axes represent the time, the y-axes the trajectories y(t). Six different cases are shown: the first graph represents the system with no fault compensation (say, u(t) 0); the other ones are with compensation, respectively, with time step equal to 0.4, 0.12, 0.09, 0.06, 0.01. case that has been exploited to introduce our decoding approach to FTC in the easiest way, but real systems are in general more complicated. Two main realistic cases should be discussed:
(1) The disturbance function is quantised, but assumes more than two values. (2) The disturbance function is not quantised.
Both problems require detection and also identification of the disturbance (see Section 1). Point (1) can be tackled with our approach (see Remark 1): if q is the number of quantisation levels, it suffices to adapt the disturbance estimation task in the One-State Algorithm performing a comparison among q Euclidean distances. Nevertheless, the corresponding Figure 6 . Nominal system vs. system with a failure at T F ¼ 20, with measurement noise of variance 2 ¼ 2 and f(t) ¼ sin t. The xaxes represent the time, the y-axes the trajectories y(t). Six different cases are shown: the first graph represents the system with no fault compensation (say, u(t) 0); the other ones are with compensation, respectively, with time step equal to 0.525, 0.35, 0.3, 0.01, 0.001. theoretical analysis turns out to be more complicated. The second problem, instead, can be approached introducing a sufficiently fine quantisation, taking into account that a larger number of quantisation levels produces more precise results in spite of numerical complexity.
The examination of these issues is beyond the purpose of this work, but some observations can be made about the following point: what happens if we apply the One-State Algorithm presented in Section 3.1 when the value of the disturbance function z(t) is constant, but unknown, after the failure?
More precisely, let us suppose that z(t) 2 { 0 , } where 0 ¼ 1 and 2 (0, 1) is not given, whileẑðtÞ 2 f 0 , 1 g, 1 being fixed: the algorithm works with two quantised states, but the failure state value that it considers may be incorrect. Then, let us find which error is produced by this inaccurate quantisation; naturally, we expect that if is sufficiently close to 0 , the outcomes will be sufficiently reliable. Note also that the false positive discussion is not touched by this issue.
First of all, we have to distinguish the errors in the detection task and in the trajectories. The detection is correct if we become aware of the switch of z(t) from 0 to ; in this case, the One-State Algorithm estimates z(t) with 1 . It is easy to compute that the probability of incorrect detection is given by
The calculus is analogous to the one for P det and the result is similar, but with 0 þ 1 À 2 instead of 0 À 1 Now, let us analyse it in the example proposed in Section 5.1.1, in the case of constant f: considering d ¼ 0, we have
This suggests that if j 0 þ 1 À 2j 4 j 0 À 1 j, the detection is better in the inaccurate quantisation case. This is equivalent to require that 5 1 in the case 0 ¼ 1 and 1 , 2 (0, 1), which is a quite intuitive result. Thus, in the case of inaccurate quantisation detection may even be more reliable than in the exact case. On the other hand, inaccurate quantisation always produces an error in the trajectory: even in the case of exact detection, the recovered trajectory will not be the fault-free one since the error function E k does not decay to zero. Let us present a few simulations: considering our Flight Control Problem, we apply our FTC design in the hypotheses that 1 ¼ 1 2 is the quantisation failure level considered by the algorithm, while ¼ 0.45 is the real value assumed by z(t) after the failure. Some outcomes are shown in Figure 7 , where the graphs of the trajectories are reported. The first two graphs represent the case with ¼ 0.01. We have already said that in this case the detection (with perfect quantisation) is not reliable either before or after the failure. Instead, if the quantisation is inaccurate and 5 1 as in our instance, the detection is correct after the failure. This can be appreciated in the second graph: the corresponding trajectory is parallel to the fault-free one, while the trajectory in the case ¼ 1 is closer to the fault-free one, but very 'noisy'. The decision about which result is preferable depends on the applications: if we imagine y(t) to represent the trajectory of an aircraft, if 5 1 , y(t) is in general more distant from the planned trajectory, but the flight for ¼ 1 seems to be too disturbed.
The third and fourth graphs show the instance ¼ 0.09, where perfect detection is achieved with ¼ 1 ¼ 0.5. Detection is correct in both cases, but only if ¼ 1 we get back to the right trajectory after the failure. However, let us note that an appreciable improvement is obtained also in the case ¼ 0.45, 1 ¼ 1/2 if compared to the faulty system without control: the distance between fault-free and 'FTC with ¼ 0.45, 1 ¼ 1/2' trajectories is about 1/5 the distance between fault-free and 'faulty, not controlled' trajectories.
Conclusions
In this article, we have presented an original FTC method, based on information and coding/decoding theory. Given a linear system we have shown how to detect a quantised disturbance using a low-complexity, recursive decoding technique known as One-State Algorithm and derived from the BCJR. Its application to a flight FTC problem has generated satisfactory outcomes even in the case of relative high measurement noise in the data.
The low-complexity of the One-State Algorithm encourages its implementation; moreover, its performance can be controlled by tuning the sampling time step . In some cases, for instance when f is constant, an optimal value of can be analytically computed with sufficient precision.
In this work, which is a first attempt to combine control problems and decoding techniques, we have considered the straightforward case of a binary quantisation with known quantisation levels. However, the One-State Algorithm can be implemented in more complex and realistic scenarios as well (e.g. when the values of the possible states are not known or when the number of quantisation levels is larger than two), with the understanding that the theoretical analysis of its performance becomes more complicated.
Simulations show that the choice of the input f(t) plays a role in the detection performance, which will be investigated in future work. In particular, here we have supposed f(t) to be an exogenic known signal, but extensions to inputs generated in a different way (e.g. by a feedback controller) might be considered. Finally, future work will be oriented to merge our decoding approach into advanced control schemes, such as those that provide a control reconfiguration through model predictive control and redundancy of actuators. σ 2 = 2 τ = 0.09 Fault-free system Faulty system (with FTC), α = 0.45, ζ 1 = 0.5
Faulty system (with FTC), α = ζ 1 = 0.5 Figure 7 . Error due to inaccurate quantisation. The graphs represent the trajectories y in function of the time t. Top: the graphs for ¼ 0.01: after the failure, if ¼ 1 ¼ 0.5 the detection presents many errors, while if ¼ 0.45, 1 ¼ 0.5, it is exact (the corresponding trajectory is perfectly parallel to the desired one). Bottom: the graphs for ¼ 0.09: after the failure, in both cases ¼ 1 ¼ 0.5 and ¼ 0.45, 1 ¼ 0.5 the detection is correct, but in the second case the obtained trajectory is not the desired one. However, we have to notice the evident improvement with respect to the not controlled system: the trajectory error in the case of control with inaccurate quantisation is about 1/5 the error in the not controlled case.
